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Testing a model of the antecedents and 
consequences of budgetary participation 
on job performance 
Vincent K. Chong and Darren M. Johnson* 
Abstract-This paper examines the effect of antecedents (such as task exceptions and task analysability) and con- 
sequences (such as job-relevant information, budget goal level, budget goal acceptance and budget goal commitment) 
of budgetary participation on job performance. The responses of 135 middle-level managers, drawn from a cross- 
section of manufacturing firms, to a survey questionnaire, were analysed by using a structural equation modelling 
(SEM) technique. The results of this study suggest that task exceptions and task analysability are important an- 
tecedents of budgetary participation. The results further suggest that the cognitive effect of participation in goal- 
setting allows subordinates to gather. exchange and share job-relevant information. The availability of job-relevant 
information allows subordinates to develop effective strategies or plans, which will help them to exert effort over 
time, in an attempt to attain their goals. The results support the proposition that setting difficult but attainable budg- 
et goals increases subordinates’ budget goal level, acceptance, and commitment to the budget goal, which in turn 
improves job performance. 
Key words: Budgetary participation; information processing theory; goal-setting theory; job performance; struc- 
tural equation modelling (SEM) technique 
1. Introduction 
Subordinate participation in budget-setting is one 
of the most researched topics in management ac- 
counting literature. The results of studies into the 
effects of budgetary participation on subordinates’ 
job performance have been equivocal . I  The in- 
conclusive results may be due to the lack of un- 
derstanding of the mechanism by which budgetary 
participation may affect subordinates’ job per- 
formance. Brownell and McInnes (1986), for ex- 
ample, relied on expectancy theory and used 
motivation as an intervening variable to study the 
impact of budgetary participation on performance. 
However, Brownell and McInnes’s results failed to 
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Accounting and Finance (M250) at the University of Western 
Australia and Customer Education Officer at the Department 
of Treasury and Finance, 200 St Georges Terrace. Perth, 
Western Australia 6000. They would like to thank Mahmoud 
Ezzamel, Chris Guilding, Chong Man Lau, Ken Peasnell, 
Geoff Soutar, Pauline Weetman (the editor) and two anony- 
mous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on 
earlier drafts of this paper. An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the 2004 Brirish Accounting Associalion (BAA) 
Annual Conference, York, U K  and 2005 Asian-Pacific 
Conference on lnfernurional Accounting Issues. Wellington. 
New Zealand. This research project received financial support 
from the Research Centre of Accounting and Finance at the 
University of Western Australia. Questionnaire is available 
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Crawley. WA 6009. Tel: +618 6488 2914; Fax: +618 6488 
1047; E-mail: Vincent.Chong@biz.uwa.edu.au 
This paper was accepted in November 2006. 
confirm a positive relationship between budgetary 
participation and motivation. In an attempt to re- 
solve Brownell and McInnes’s (1986) inconclu- 
sive results, Chong and Chong (2002) relied on 
goal-setting theory to examine the impact of budg- 
etary participation on performance. They found 
that budgetary participation affects subordinates’ 
job performance through: (1 )  the increase in their 
budget goal commitment, and (2) the cognitive 
benefits derived from sharing internal information 
during the budget-setting process. 
Nevertheless, three issues merit further investi- 
gation. First, we improve on Chong and Chong 
(2002) by including other important motivational 
factors such as budget goal level (difficulty) and 
budget goal acceptance within the goal-setting the- 
ory framework. For example, prior studies (e.g., 
Locke et al., 1981; Wier, 1993) have found that 
budget goal level has some influence on commit- 
ment and job performance. Leifer and McGannon 
(1986) found that goal acceptance and goal com- 
mitment are separate and distinguishable con- 
structs and, as such, should not be treated as the 
same constructs. Shields and Shields (1998) called 
for future research in participative budgeting to in- 
’ For example, some studies (e.g. Merchant, 1981) have 
confirmed that budgetary participation has a positive effect on 
performance while other studies ( eg .  Stedry, 1960; Bryan and 
Locke, 1967) have found the relationship to be negative and 
yet. few studies (e.g. Milani, 1975, Kenis, 1979) have found 
that there were no relationships between budgetary participa- 
tion and performance. 
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4 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
the higher the level of budget goal commitment 
(Link 10 of Figure 1) .  In addition, it is proposed 
that the higher the level of budget goal acceptance, 
the higher the level of budget goal commitment 
(Link 11 of Figure 1). Finally, we propose that the 
use of both information-processing theory and 
goal-setting theory suggests that the availability of 
job-relevant information will facilitate subordi- 
nates who have high budget goal acceptance and 
commitment to enhance their job performance 
(Links 12, 13 and 14 of Figure 1). 
The remainder of this paper is organised as fol- 
lows. In the next section, the theoretical model un- 
derlying the study is developed. Subsequent 
sections present the method employed, results, dis- 
cussions and limitation of the study. 
clude other variables (such as goal acceptance) 
that intervene between participative budgeting and 
dependent variables. Second, Chong and Chong 
relied on a single theoretical framework (i.e., goal- 
setting theory), despite prior researchers 
(Feyeraband, 1981 ; Eisenhardt, 1988; Conlon and 
Parks, 1990) claim that a multi-theoretical frame- 
work can enhance our understanding of phenome- 
na? Third, Chong and Chong focused on the 
consequences of budgetary participation without 
considering its causal antecedents. This has been a 
major criticism of prior budgetary participation 
studies (see e.g., Clinton et al., 1992; Shields and 
Young, 1993; Shields and Shields, 1998). 
Thus, the objective of this study is to attempt to 
partially replicate and extend Chong and Chong 
(2002) by developing a model (see Figure l) ,  
which relies on a multi-theoretical framework (i.e., 
goal-setting theory and information-processing 
theory) to examine the impact of budgetary partic- 
ipation on subordinates’ job performance. 
Specifically, this study proposes that task uncer- 
tainty is an antecedent of budgetary participation. 
This study focuses on only one of the antecedents 
of budgetary participation, namely task uncertain- 
ty, as the theoretical development underpinning 
this study is concerned with the internal environ- 
ment. It is suggested that the presence of task un- 
certainty (in term of task exceptions and task 
analysability) causes the need for job-relevant in- 
formation and budgetary participation (Links 1 ,  2, 
3 and 4 of Figure 1). We suggest that subordinates’ 
participation in the budget-setting process pro- 
vides the opportunity for them to gather job-rele- 
vant information which will facilitate their 
decision making process (Link 5 ,  Figure 1). In ad- 
dition, we propose that by relying on goal-setting 
theory, subordinates’ participation in the budget- 
setting process induces higher budget goal level, 
budget goal acceptance and commitment (Links 6, 
7 and 8 of Figure 1). It is suggested that the high- 
er the budget goal level, the higher the level of 
budget goal acceptance (Link 9 of Figure 1) and 
To date, the participative budgeting studies have relied on 
agency theory (e.g., Shields and Young, 1993), attribution the- 
ory (e.g.. Nouri, et al., 1999). expectancy theory (e.g., 
Brownell and McInnes, 1986), goal-setting theory (e.g., 
Chong and Chong, 2002), and information-processing theory 
(e.g., Kren, 1992). 
Van de Ven and Delbecq (1974:183-184) conceptualised 
task exceptions as task variability and defined it as being ‘the 
number of exceptional cases encountered in the work requir- 
ing different methods or procedures for doing the worL“. and 
task analysability is conceptualised as task difficulty and de- 
fined as the “analysability of the work itself and the extent to 
which there is a known procedure that specifies the sequence 
of steps to followed in performing the task’. ‘ Job-relevant information reduces uncertainty. improves 
decision-makers’ ability to make predictions, or confirms or 
corrects their prior expectations (see Romney and Steinbart, 
2003). 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
development 
2.1. The relationship between task uncertainty and 
budgetary participation 
The first two hypotheses are concerned with the 
relationship between task uncertainty and budget- 
ary participation. Task uncertainty is conceptu- 
alised as consisting of two dimensions: task 
exceptions and task analysability (see Perrow, 
1967; Van de Ven and Delbecq, 1974; Withey et 
al., 1983; Brownell and Dunk, 1991).3 Task excep- 
tions refer to ‘the frequency of unexpected and 
novel events that occur in the conversion process’; 
while task analysability refers to ‘the extent to 
which work can be reduced to programmable me- 
chanical steps’ (Withey et al., 1983:46; Brownell 
and Dunk, 1991). Budgetary participation, on the 
other hand, is defined as “a process in which indi- 
viduals, whose performance will be evaluated, and 
possibly rewarded, on the basis of their achieve- 
ment of budgeted targets, are involved in, and have 
influence on, the setting of these targets” 
(Brownell, 1982: 124; Greenberg, Greenberg and 
Nouri, 1984). Relying on information-processing 
theory (Galbraith, 1973, 1977), it is argued that 
‘the greater the task uncertainty, the greater the 
amount of job-relevant information that must be 
processed among decision-makers during task ex- 
ecution in order to achieve a given level of per- 
formance’ (Galbraith, 1973:4, italicisation 
added).“ This view is supported by the extant or- 
ganisational and behavioural literature (e.g., 
Hague et al., 1971; Duncan, 1972; Van de Ven et 
al., 1976; Tushman and Nadler, 1978). For exam- 
ple, Tushman and Nadler (1978) identified that in 
situations involving simple and routine tasks, in- 
formation-processing requirements are kept to a 
minimum; as such tasks can be solved by existing 
rules and procedures. Tasks that are not well un- 
derstood prior to execution and complex in nature 
require additional processing of information by 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 00
:23
 27
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
14
 
Vol. 37 No. 1. 2007 5 
- .  . .  . .  . .  . .  ................................................................ 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 00
:23
 27
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
14
 
6 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
(a): There is a positive relationship between 
task exceptions and job-relevant informa- 
tion. 
(b): There is a positive relationship between 
task exceptions and budgetary participa- 
tion. 
decision-makers. Van de Ven et al. (1976:328) es- 
tablished that further information is necessary 
when task uncertainty occurs at the work unit level 
of the organisation; and the additional information 
would be obtained through the use of horizontal 
communication channels and both scheduled and 
unscheduled group meetings. Thus, subordinates 
faced with a high level of task uncertainty would 
seek additional job-relevant information through 
budgetary participation. This viewpoint is further 
supported by Mia (1987), who argued that when 
employees participate to obtain and process addi- 
tional information about their jobs, they get a 
clearer understanding of their job and their levels 
of perceived task difficulty are reduced. Shields 
and Shields (1998) maintained that budgetary par- 
ticipation is for the sharing of internal information 
that is predicted to be associated with task uncer- 
tainty. Specifically, Shields and Shields found that 
budgetary participation exists for when there is 
task uncertainty. The foregoing discussion sug- 
gests that task uncertainty is an antecedent variable 
of budgetary participation. It is postulated that the 
demand for budgetary participation is caused by 
the subordinates’ levels of task uncertainty. Thus, 
it is argued that the existence of budgetary partici- 
pation for sharing of internal information is ex- 
pected to be associated with subordinates’ levels of 
task uncertainty. 
As noted earlier, task uncertainty is conceptu- 
alised as having two dimensions: task exceptions 
and task analysability. It is proposed that when 
task exceptions are low, such tasks would be con- 
sidered as either repetitious or routine and could be 
solved through existing procedures and rules 
(Tushman and Nadler, 1978). When confronted 
with these tasks, it is expected that subordinates 
require less job-relevant information for decision- 
making. However, when task exceptions are high, 
subordinates would not be able to predict the prob- 
lems in advance (e.g., Perrow, 1967; Withey et al., 
1983). Thus, it is suggested that subordinates who 
are faced with tasks that have a high number of ex- 
ceptions will require additional job-relevant infor- 
mation. As noted earlier, subordinates can obtain 
additional job-relevant information through budg- 
etary participation (e.g. Campbell and Gingrich, 
1986; Mia, 1987; Shields and Shields, 1998). 
Thus, it follows that when task exceptions are 
high, the need for participation is likely to be high. 
Hence, it is postulated that task exceptions are ex- 
pected to be positively associated with job-rele- 
vant information and budgetary participation. The 
following hypotheses, stated formally, are tested: 
Numerous non-accounting studies (e.g., Earley and 
Kanfer, 1985; Campbell and Gingrich, 1986) also support this 
argument. 
H 
H 
With respect to task analysability, it is suggested 
that readily analysable tasks may be solved by ex- 
isting procedures and rules (e.g., Perrow, 1967; 
Withey et al., 1983). It is expected that subordi- 
nates require less job-relevant information for de- 
cision making when confronted with these tasks. 
However, when the level of task analysability is 
low, subordinates may need time to think and to 
search beyond existing procedures and policies. 
Thus, it is expected that subordinates faced with 
tasks that have a low level of analysability will re- 
quire additional job-relevant information. This in- 
formation will be obtained through participation 
within the budgeting process (e.g. Campbell and 
Gingrich, 1986; Mia, 1987; Shields and Shields, 
1998). Thus, it follows that when task analysabili- 
ty is low, the need for participation is likely to be 
high. Hence, it is predicted that task analysability 
is expected to be negatively associated with job- 
relevant information and budgetary participation. 
The following hypotheses, stated formally, are 
tested: 
H2(a): There is a negative relationship between 
task analysability and job-relevant infor- 
mation. 
H2(b): There is a negative relationship between 
task analysability and budgetary participa- 
tion. 
2.2. The relationship between budgetary 
participation and job-relevant information 
Our third hypothesis is concerned with the rela- 
tionship between budgetary participation and job- 
relevant information. Job-relevant information is 
defined as “information that facilitates job-related 
decision making” (Kren, 1992:5 11).  Prior studies 
(e.g., Kren, 1992; Magner et al., 1996; Chong and 
Chong, 2002) have examined the cognitive role of 
budgetary participation. These studies confirmed 
that budgetary participation facilitates the gather- 
ing of job-relevant information. For example, 
Kren ( 19925 13) argued that budget participation 
can create an environment that encourages the ac- 
quisition and use of job-relevant information. 
Magner et al. (1 996) argued that subordinates’ par- 
ticipation in the budget-setting process enables 
them to obtain information that is relevant to per- 
forming their jobs.” Magner et al. (1996:43) fur- 
ther argued that the act of participation allows 
subordinates to interact with superiors whereby 
subordinates can ask questions to clarify goals, 
work strategies, conditions in the work environ- 
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ment, and other factors that are salient to their 
jobs. In addition, Chong and Chong (2002) found 
that budgetary participation provided an opportu- 
nity for subordinates to gather, exchange, and dis- 
seminate job-relevant information with their 
superiors or peers regarding their work environ- 
ment and budget goals. Murray (1990), on the 
other hand, theorised that budgetary participation 
might help to enhance performance by providing 
individuals the opportunity to ask questions relat- 
ed to the tasks, thereby increasing their job-rele- 
vant information. Shields and Shields (199859) 
suggested that the cognitive role of budgetary par- 
ticipation improves a subordinate’s quality of deci- 
sions as a result of sharing information with the 
superior? Based on the preceding discussions, we 
conclude that the cognitive role of budgetary par- 
ticipation is expected to increase job-relevant in- 
formation. Thus, stated formally, the following 
hypothesis is tested: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between 
budgetary participation and job-relevant 
information. 
I 
2.3. The relationships between budgetary 
participation, budget goal level, budget goal 
acceptance, and budget goal commitment 
Relying on goal-setting theory (Locke, 1968; 
Locke et a]., 1981; Locke and Latham, 1990; see 
also Murray, 1990; Chong and Leung, 2003), it is 
suggested that participation in setting budget goals 
can influence subordinates’ budget goal level and 
motivation.’ It is suggested that setting difficult 
but attainable goals leads to higher performance 
than setting either specific moderate or easy goals 
(e.g., Murray, 1990; Locke and Latham, 1990). 
The mechanisms by which difficult goals lead to 
greater action is centred around three elements of 
motivation. These are: (1) intensity of effort, (2) 
duration or time, and (3) direction towards an ac- 
tivity (see Locke and Latham, 1990). Specifically, 
Locke and Latham (1 990) argued that specific and 
difficult goals caused a greater effort to be ex- 
pended over a greater period of time in comparison 
to those goals considered as easy or ‘do your best’. 
They (p. 92) suggested that goals have two direc- 
tional effects. ‘First, they orient the individual to- 
ward goal-relevant activities and materials, and 
away from goal irrelevant ones. Second, they 
activafe stored knowledge and skills that the indi- 
vidual possesses that are perceived as relevant to 
the task.’ Therefore, if effort is directed towards 
the activity or goal, then it is more likely the goal 
can be reached. Thus, difficult goals in comparison 
to easy goals will lead to greater effort being ex- 
pended, over an extended period of time providing 
that effort is expended towards some goal.8 
Participation enhances an individual’s feeling of 
involvement in the budget goal-setting process. 
Numerous studies (Latham et al., 1978; Kenis, 
1979; Kren and Liao, 1988; Murray, 1990; Wier, 
1993) have proposed that budgetary participation 
is positively associated with budget goal level. 
Kren and Liao (1988), for example, argued that 
subordinates may be motivated to disclose infor- 
mation during the participation process that results 
in the setting of more difficult budget goal level. 
Murray ( 1990) theorised that budgetary participa- 
tion may result in increased budget goal level. 
Wier (1 993) found that budgetary participation 
was positively associated with budget goal level. 
Thus, the existing theoretical and empirical evi- 
dence suggest that budgetary participation is posi- 
tively related to budget goal level. 
Budget goal acceptance refers to the extent to 
which an individual’s willingness to accept a 
budget goal level. Budget goal commitment, on 
the other hand, refers to ‘the determination to 
achieve a goal, and the willingness to put forth ef- 
fort to attain a goal’ (Renn et a]., 1999:107-108; 
see also Naylor and Ilgen, 1984; Leifer and 
McGannon, 1986). Prior studies (see e.g, Argyris, 
1952; Becker and Green, 1962; Murray, 1990; 
Shields and Shields, 1998; Chong and Chong, 
2002) suggested that subordinates who are al- 
lowed to participate in setting their budget goals 
are more likely to accepr and commit to the budg- 
et goals than subordinates who are not allowed to 
participate in the budget-setting process. Shields 
and Shields (1998) argued that budgetary partici- 
pation increases an individual’s trust, sense of con- 
trol, and ego-involvement with the organisation. 
Consequently, this individual is more likely to be 
less resistance to change and more acceptance of, 
and commitment to, the budget decisions. 
_____ 
A number of non-accounting studies also confirmed the 
cognitive role of budgetary participation (see e.g., Locke et al., 
1981; Locke and Latham, 1990; Latham et al., 1994). ’ The implications of these studies suggested that budgetary 
participation provides ‘positive’ communication between su- 
periors and subordinates. I t  is argued that budgetary participa- 
tion motivates subordinates to reveal their private information 
in their budgets. In other words, individuals who participate in  
the budget-setting process do not incorporate budgetary slack 
in  their budget and as a result, set higher goals for themselves. 
However, other study studies (e.g., Shields et al.. 2000; Lukka, 
1988) predicted and found a negative association between par- 
ticipative budgeting and goal level. These studies, however, 
relied on the economic theory of agency. Agency theory-based 
studies predict that subordinates have the incentive to set an 
easy (lower) budget goal level especially their rewards are 
based on they ability to attain the budget goal level which they 
participated in the setting process. The present study relies on 
goal-setting theory. 
Evidence from previous research (e.g. Bavelas and Lee, 
1978) confirmed that goals that are specific and difficult will 
cause individuals to work longer and harder compared goals 
that are easy. For example, Bavelas and Lee (1978) found that 
individuals with easy goals generally stopped working on their 
goals sooner than those individuals who had difficult or hard- 
er goals. 
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8 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
Furthermore, it is argued that the intention or ac- 
tions of the individual cannot be translated into the 
appropriate goals or behaviours without the indi- 
vidual acceptance of a goal (Locke 1968). Erez 
and Kanfer ( 1  983) argued that employees who par- 
ticipated in establishing their annual budget goals, 
experienced the feeling of involvement and less re- 
sistance toward the goal-setting process than the 
employees who were not allowed to participate. 
Specifically, Erez and Kanfer found that budgetary 
participation was a valuable motivational tool in 
ensuring subordinates’ acceptance of the budget 
goals. I t  is argued that a goal is more likely to be 
accepted by subordinates when they have a \vice 
in setting it (see Locke and Latham, 1990): Renn 
(1998: 116) found that ‘participation enhances 
one’s feeling of involvement in the goal-setting 
process. In so doing, participation lower one’s re- 
sistance to accepting an externally imposed goals’. 
Several studies supported the positive association 
between budgetary participation and budget goal 
commitment (see e.g., Locke, 1968; Erez et al., 
1985; Erez and Arad, 1986). 
In summary, the preceding discussions suggest 
that biidgetnry ycirticipcition e.uists to indiice high- 
er budget goal level, nnd lmxiiote more ticcept- 
nnce of, rind coniniitnzent to.  budget gonls. These 
ideas are expressed in the following hypotheses: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between 
budgetary participation and budget goal 
level. 
There is a positive relationship between 
budgetary participation and budget goal 
acceptance. 
There is a positive relationship between 
budgetary participation and budget goal 
com mi t men t . 
H5: 
H6: 
2.4.  The re1citionship.r behtven budget gocil level,  
budget goal cicceptcince. anel budget gonl 
coniniitnient 
Relying on goal-setting theory, it is argued that 
an individual’s behaviour is regulated by his or her 
conscious ideas and intentions. A goal is viewed a s  
the objective or the performance level that an indi- 
vidual seeks to attain. If an individual is commit- 
ted to goal attainment, i t  will influence the 
individual’s actions and consequently perform- 
ance. Furthermore, i t  is suggested that goal-setting 
influences the amount of, and duration ofthe effort 
expended (Murray, 1990; see also Locke et al., 
1981; Locke and Latham, 1990). Murray (1990) 
argued that a more difficult goal (assuming that i t  
has been accepted and committed) should induce 
more effort. Prior studies (Murray, 1990; Shields 
and Shields, 1998) have proposed that when sub- 
’ Voice provides a subordinate with an opportunity to ex- 
press hisiher views about ii decision (Earley and Lind, 19x7). 
ordinates are given the opportunity to set their 
budget goal levels, they are more likely to accept 
and conitnit to the budget goals than subordinates 
who are not allowed to participate in the budget 
goal-setting process. Furthermore, participative 
budgeting increases an individual’s trust. sense of 
control, and ego involvement with the organisation 
(Shields and Shields, 1998). Hence, it is argued 
that a budget goal level is more likely to be ac- 
cepted and committed by an individual who par- 
ticipated in setting such goal level. Thus, it is 
predicted that budget goal level is positively asso- 
ciated with budget goal acceptance and budget 
goal commitment. Thus, stated formally, the fol- 
lowing hypotheses are tested: 
H7: There is a positive relationship between 
budget goal level and budget goal accept- 
ance. 
There is a positive relationship between 
budget goal level and budget goal com- 
mitment. 
Prior studies (Locke et al., 1981; Leifer and 
McGannon, 1986) have confirmed that there is a 
positive and direct effect of goal acceptance on 
goal commitment. Locke et al. (1981) recognised 
that goal acceptance and goal commitment were 
similar yet separate concepts. They referred goal 
acceptance a s  being the initial agreement or ac- 
ceptance of a goal, whereas goal commitment is 
the determination to try for a goal until i t  has been 
reached. Determination, of course, implies the ex- 
pending of effort. time and direction towards the 
relevant activity or goal. It is argued that once a 
goal has been accepted, then there is subsequent 
commitment to that goal. In analysing studies from 
1960 to 1980, Locke et al. (1981) found that in 
those studies where acceptance had been measured 
and included, most of the participants showed 
complete and substantial commitment to the goal. 
Leifer and McGannon ( 1986) proposed that higher 
levels of goal acceptance should always lead to 
higher levels of goal commitment. Thus, i t  can be 
concluded that when a subordinate accepts a budg- 
et goal, there will be a greater commitment to that 
goal in comparison to a subordinate that does not 
accept the budget goal. Thus. i t  is predicted that 
budget goal acceptance is positively associated 
with budget goal commitment. These ideas are ex- 
pressed as the following hypotheses: 
H9: There is a positive relationship between 
budget goal acceptance and budget goal 
commitment. 
H8: 
2.5. The relutiotisliip l?ebveeii joh-r-elevcint 
injortiicition c i n d  Dudget gonl cicceptrrnce cine1 
h uclg r t g m  1 con in1 itniet I t 
Existing studies (e.g., Kren, 1992; Magner et al., 
1996; see also Chong, 1996) and information-pro- 
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cessing theory (see Galbraith, 1973. 1977; 
Tushman and Nadler. 1978) have provided evi- 
dence to suggest that as task uncertainty increases, 
the need for job-relevant information becomes in- 
creasingly important and useful to managers for 
decision-making purposes. 
Relying on goal-setting theory, it is argued that 
once a subordinate has accepted a budget goal, 
which is specific and difficult but attainable, the 
three direct mechanisms (i.e., effort, persistence 
and direction of attention) of goal-setting are 
brought into play."' These three direct mechanisms 
of goal-setting are motivational because it requires 
individuals to take actions involving hard works to 
accomplish the objective. If an individual finds 
that these mechanisms are not sufficient (e.g., due 
to the presence of task uncertainty), he/she may at- 
tempt to discover other better strategies for per- 
forming the task. Thus, we argue that with the 
presence of task uncertainty, the three direct mech- 
anisms alone are not sufficient to help a subordi- 
nate to attain hidher goal. This is because 
subordinates need to develop task-relevant strate- 
gies, in order to discover /?ow their goal can be 
reached. Thus, we postulate that the presence of 
task uncertainty motivates subordinates to exert 
greater effort directed toward strategy develop- 
ment (Locke and Latham, 1990; see also Hirst, 
1987). The cognitive effect of budgetary participa- 
tion enables subordinates to develop strategies to 
achieve the relevant task, and consequently these 
task strategies ensure that the subordinates direct 
their effort and attention towards the appropriate 
goal (see Chong and Chong. 2002). Campbell et 
al., (l970), for example, argued that goal-setting 
helped to clarify the task to be performed to the ex- 
tent that they give subordinates explicit knowledge 
of where to direct their effort. Hirst (1987) theo- 
rised that the cognitive activities, such as the inter- 
pretation, search and selection of job-relevant 
information, would allow subordinates to put forth 
additional effort to attain their goal. 
In summary, we expect that with the presence of 
task uncertainty, participative budget goal-setting 
stimulates individual to develop effective strate- 
gies, which involves both the search for. and se- 
lection of, valid strategies, for attaining goals 
(Locke et al., 1981; Naylor and Ilgen, 1984; Hirst, 
1987; Locke and Latham, 1990). In the present 
study, we expect that there is no direct relationship 
between job-relevant information and job per- 
formance for our structural model (see Figure I ) .  
We offer the following two plausible reasons. 
First, our structural model includes task uncertain- 
9 
ty as an antecedent variable to budgetary partici- 
pation. Second, relying on information-processing 
theory and goal-setting theory, we argue that the 
presence of task uncertainty will initially direct 
subordinates' effort toward strategy development 
and task learning, rather than the three direct goal 
mechanisms (i.e., effort, persistence and direction 
of attention) of goal setting. Effort directed toward 
strategy development and task learning, leads to 
delayed performance increases (Locke et al., 198 1 ; 
Hirst, 1987; Locke and Latham, 1990; Bonner and 
Sprinkle, 2002). This view is consistent with 
Locke et al. ( 1  98 1 ) who suggest that the cognitive 
factors (such as job-relevant information) are indi- 
rectly associated with performance. We propose 
that the availability of job-relevant information 
would enable subordinates to formulate effective 
strategies or plans, which will assist them to exert 
additional effort for budget goal attainment. We 
argue that the availability of job-relevant informa- 
tion would initidly increase subordinates' budget 
goal acceptance." Budget goal acceptance is sub- 
ordinates' initial agreement with the budget goal 
(Locke. 1968; Locke and Latham, 1990). It im- 
plies moderated degree of acceptance of budget 
goal. Budget goal commitment, on the other hand, 
suggests subordinate's resistance to changing the 
budget goal at a later point in time. We further 
argue that as subordinates gather more job-rele- 
vant information which enables them to formulate 
effective strategies or plans for budget goal attain- 
ment, they will exert higher degree of commitment 
towards budget goal. In  other words, a higher de- 
gree of commitment is viewed as the more inclu- 
sive concept in that it refers to one's attachment to 
or determination to achieve a budget goal. Taken 
together, we postulate that job-relevant informa- 
tion is positively associated with budget goal ac- 
ceptance and budget goal commitment. This idea 
is expressed in the following hypotheses: 
H10: There is a positive relationship between 
job-relevant information and budget goal 
acceptance. 
There is a positive relationship between 
job-relevant information and budget goal 
commitment. 
H11: 
lo See Locke et al. (1981) for a detailed discussion of the 
terms effort, persistence and direction. 
I' Budget goal acceptance is subordinates' initial agreement 
with the budget goal (Locke. 1068: Locke and Latham. 1990). 
2.6. The relationship between budget g o d  
conirnitnient and job perjbrmance 
The last hypothesis is concerned with the rela- 
tionship between budget goal commitment and job 
performance. As noted earlier, a primary predic- 
tion of goal-setting theory is that setting specific, 
difficult but attainable goals will be beneficial to 
performance compared to easy goals. Reviews of 
goal-setting studies showed that, in general, once 
individuals are committed to the budget goals, 
they will increase the effort required to achieve 
those goals. Individuals who are committed to spe- 
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10 
cific, difficult but attainable goals will try harder 
and persist longer, and will be more effective than 
less committed individuals (Locke and Latham, 
1990). As a result, the more effort that is applied to 
goal attainment, the greater the chance of goal at- 
tainment, thus improving job performance. Thus, 
it is concluded that budget goal commitment 
should be positively associated with job perform- 
ance. Numerous studies (see e.g., Earley and 
Kanfer, 1985; Erez et al., 1985; Erez, 1986; Erez 
and Arad, 1986; Locke et al., 1988; Locke and 
Latham, 1990; Wofford et al., 1992; Shields and 
Shields, 1998; Fisher et al., 2002; Wentzel, 2002) 
provided empirical support for this proposed rela- 
tionship between budget goal commitment and job 
performance. Shields and Shields (1998) argued 
that the motivational role of budgetary participa- 
tion enhances budget goal commitment, which in 
turn, improved performance. Fisher et al. 
(2002:32) argued that ‘there should be a positive 
relation between commitment and subordinates 
performance’. Specifically, they found that subor- 
dinates in dyads that do reach agreement will be 
more committed to attaining their budget goals and 
perform at higher levels. In contrast, subordinates 
in dyads that do not reach agreement will be less 
committed to attaining their budget goals and per- 
form at lower levels. Thus, the existing theoretical 
and empirical evidence suggest that the higher the 
level of budget goal commitment, the higher the 
level of subordinates’ job performance. Stated for- 
mally, the following hypothesis is tested: 
H12: There is a positive relationship between 
budget goal commitment and job perform- 
ance. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
Each participant was sent a covering letter, a 
questionnaire and a prepaid self-addressed enve- 
lope. The prepaid self-addressed envelope facili- 
tates correspondence and ensures that the 
questionnaires are returned directly to one of the 
researchers. The questionnaires were pre-coded to 
identify those non-respondents so that follow-up 
letters can be sent. A total of 162 questionnaires 
were received, giving a response rate of 45.63%. 
Of the 162 questionnaires, 24 were excluded from 
the study for incomplete responses and three were 
considered as outliers.’* This resulted in 135 us- 
able responses for our data analysis. 
The organisations have an average of 202 em- 
ployees. Each manager, on average, had a respon- 
sibility for 30 employees. The average age of each 
participant was 43 years. The average length of 
time spent in the position was nearly five years and 
each manager had, on average, 12 years experi- 
ence in his or her current area of responsibility. 
Most managers had been employed by their re- 
spective organisation for an average of 10 years. 
3.2. Measurement of variables 
Task exceptions and task analysability were eval- 
uated by a nine-item, seven-point Likert-type scale 
developed by Withey et al. (1983). Budgetary par- 
ticipation was measured by a six-item, seven-point 
Likert-type scale developed by Milani (1975). Job- 
relevant information was measured by a three-item, 
seven-point Likert-type scale developed by Kren 
( 1  992). Budget goal level was measured by a five- 
item, five-point Likert-type scale developed by 
Kenis (1 979). Budget goal acceptance was rneas- 
ured by a three-item, seven-point Likert-type scale 
developed originally by Leifer and McGannon 
( 1  986), which was subsequently validated by Renn 
et al. (1999). Budget goal commitment was rneas- 
ured by a two-item, five-point Likert-type scale de- 
veloped by Tubbs (1993). Job performance was 
measured by a scale developed by Mahoney et al. 
3. Research method 
3.1. Sampling selection 
A survey methodology approach was used in this 
study. A total of 185 manufacturing firms located 
in Western Australia and New South Wales were 
randomly chosen from the 2001 Who5 Who of 
Australia electronic database. The criterion for the 
sample inclusion was that all respondents are mid- 
dle-level managers and they have budget responsi- 
bility. A total of 435 middle-level managers were 
identified from the 185 manufacturing firms for 
the project. Telephone contact was then made with 
each organisation to verify and confirm that the 
managers selected were still the incumbent of the 
position. From this confirmation, 355 middle-level 
managers were then selected as part of the final 
sample. Eighty managers were not included in the 
final sample for a number of reasons. First, 43 
managers had since left their respective organisa- 
tion; second, 16 managers had retired; and third, 
21 managers had moved to other areas of their or- 
ganisation. 
l 2  In this study, three responses were considered as outliers. 
These three responses were from firms, which have employed 
relatively more employees than the rest of the firms. These 
three firms have employed 2.200, l0,OOO and 15,000 employ- 
ees, respectively. A univariate assessment of the values of the 
standardized scores reveals that two responses exceeded the 
recommended threshold standardised values (Z scores) range 
from ?3 to ?4 (Hair et al., 1998:65). The third response has a 
standardised value (Z score) of 1.18, but given that the firm 
has employed 2,200 employees and the average mean score 
for employees in other firms was 202, we treat this third re- 
sponse as an outlier. We believe these three responses are 
‘truly aberrant’ and not representative of any observations of 
the population (see Hair et al., 1998:66). The structural equa- 
tion modeling (SEM) analyses were repeated before the ex- 
clusion of the three outliers. The results revealed that there 
were no differences between SEM results based on 138 (be- 
fore exclusion of the three responses) and those based on I35 
responses (after the exclusion of the three responses). These 
results imply that the results are relatively robust to variations 
in the size (i.e. number of employees) of sample organisations. 
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12 
(1963, 1965). This instrument is a nine-item, seven- 
point Likert-type scale." Consistent with prior re- 
search (e.g., Kren, 1992; Chong and Chong, 2002), 
this study use the single overall job performance 
rating in our data analysis and hypothesis testing. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
4. Results 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and 
Pearson correlation for the independent and de- 
pendent variables used in the study.I4 
4.1. Analytical technique 
The structural equation modeling (SEM) tech- 
nique was used to test our theoretical model 
(Figure I )  and hypotheses. The SEM technique is 
based on the EQS structural equation computer 
program (Bentler, 1995). EQS provides a variety 
of statistics to assess the validity of our model. 
Evaluation of the model fit was assessed by three 
fit indices: (1) the Bentler-Bonnet normed fit index 
(NFI), (2) the Bentler-Bonnet non-normed fit 
index (NNFI) and (3) the comparative fit index 
(CFI) (Bentler and Bonnet, 1980; Bollen and 
Long, 1992). Values greater than 0.90 are desirable 
for each fit index. EQS includes sophisticated 
model specification techniques such as the 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and Wald's test 
(Bentler, 1996). This study adopted a two-step ap- 
proach recommended by Anderson and Gerbing 
(1988). First, the measurement model is evaluated 
by confirmatory factor analysis. Second, the struc- 
tural model is used to test for the hypothesised re- 
lationships. 
4.2.  Measurement model 
The measurement properties of the various 
scales used in our study were examined through 
estimation of a measurement model. Table 2 shows 
the maximum likelihood standardised loadings 
along with composite reliability and variance ex- 
tracted estimates. 
Three indices from the measurement model pro- 
vide strong support for the convergent validity of 
our scales (i.e., task exceptions, task analysability, 
budgetary participation, job-relevant information, 
budget goal level, budget goal acceptance and 
budget goal commitment). First, the standardised 
loadings, which are indicators of the degree of as- 
sociation between a scale item and latent variable. 
This instrument consists of a single overall performance 
rating with ratings on other eight dimensions of managerial 
activities. The eight dimensions of managerial activities are: 
planning, investigating. coordinating, evaluating, supervising, 
staffing, negotiating and representing (Mahoney et al., 1963, 
1965). 
l4 We tested for non-response bias by the approach suggest- 
ed by Oppenheim ( 1966). The results reveal that there were no 
statistically significant differences in the mean scores between 
the early and late responses. 
were each significant (p < 0.05). Second, the com- 
posite reliability, analogous to Cronbach alpha co- 
efficient (Cronbach, 195 1), was 0.79 or greater for 
each scale. These results suggest high internal con- 
sistency of the items comprising the various 
scales. Third, each of the variance extracted esti- 
mates, which represent the amount of variance 
captured by a construct relative to the variance due 
to random measurement error, exceeded the mini- 
mum level of 0.50 that was recommended by 
Fornell and Larcker (1981). Discriminant validity 
of the seven scales was assessed by comparing the 
variance extracted estimates with the squared cor- 
relations between the latent constructs (Fornell 
and Larker, 1981). Table 3 reveals that the squared 
correlations were all less than the variance extract- 
ed estimates (see Table 2). Taken together, these 
results provided strong support for the discrimi- 
nant validity of the seven scales. 
4.3. Structural model and tests for hypotheses 
Our structural model is analysed by aggregating 
only those items reflecting a common construct 
based on the measurement model analysis. Our 
structural model shows a very good fit to the data (x2 = 19.05, df =13, p < 0.122; NFI = 0.925, NNFI 
= 0.943, CFI = 0.973). To test our hypotheses, we 
rely on the standardised parameter estimates for 
our structural model, as shown in Figure 2. 
The results revealed that there was a positive but 
not significant relationship between task excep- 
tions and job-relevant information (standardised 
path coefficient = 0.088, n.s.). Thus, hypothesis 
Hl(a) is not supported. As expected, the results in- 
dicated that there was a positive and statistically 
significant association between task exceptions 
and budgetary participation (standardised path co- 
efficient = 0.323, p < 0.05). This result supports 
hypothesis Hl(b). Consistent with our theoretical 
expectations, the standardised parameter estimates 
between: ( I )  task analysability and job-relevant in- 
formation (standardised path coefficient = 4 .355 ,  
p < 0.05) and (2) task analysability and budgetary 
participation (standardised path coefficient = 
4 .261 ,  p < 0.05, were both negative and statisti- 
cally significant. Thus, hypotheses H2(a) and 
H2(b) are supported. 
The results presented in Figure 2 revealed that 
there was a positive and statistically significant re- 
lationship between budgetary participation and 
job-relevant information (standardised path coeffi- 
cient = 0.168, p < 0.05), thereby supporting hy- 
pothesis H3. 
Taken together, these results support the major 
premise of information-processing theory which 
proposes that the higher the level of task uncer- 
tainty, the greater the amount of job-relevant in- 
formation that must be processed among 
decision-makers during task execution in order to 
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Table 2 
Results of confirmatory factor analysis 
Construct and Standardised Comuosite 
scale item 
Task exceptions 
1. 
L .  
3. 
4. 
5. 
Task analysability 
1 .  
2. 
3. 
4. 
Budgetary participation 
1 .  
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Job-relevant information 
1 .  
2. 
3. 
Budget goal level 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Budget goal acceptance 
I .  
2. 
3. 
Budget goal commitment 
1 .  
2 .  
"Al standardised loadings are significant at p < 0.05 
loading" relidhility 
0.85 
0.72 
0.49 
0.66 
0.87 
0.87 
0.56 
0.57 
0.85 
0.83 
0.83 
0.55 
0.59 
0.89 
0.85 
0.69 
0.55 
1 .oo 
0.78 
0.85 
.0.62 
0.97 
0.69 
0.50 
0.8 I 
0.98 
0.77 
0.86 
0.99 
0.80 
0.88 
0.83 
0.86 
0.79 
0.92 
Variance 
extracted 
estimate 
0.55 
0.5 1 
0.56 
0.64 
0.55 
0.74 
0.86 
achieve a given level of performance (Galbraith, 
1973,1977; see also Romney and Steinbart, 2003). 
In addition, the results indicated that: ( 1 )  there 
was a positive and statistically significant relation- 
ship between budgetary participation and budget 
goal level (standardised path coefficient = 0.194, p 
< 0.05), (2) there was a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between budgetary partici- 
pation and budget goal acceptance (standardised 
path coefficient = 0.453, p < 0.05), and (3) there 
was a positive and statistically significant relation- 
ship between budgetary participation and budget 
goal commitment (standardised path coefficient = 
0.153, p < 0.05). Thus, hypotheses H4, H5, and H6 
are supported. 
Support is also found for hypotheses H7, H8 and 
H9, as significant results were found for the rela- 
tionships between: (1) budget goal level and budget 
goal acceptance (standardised path coefficient = 
0.248, p < 0.05), (2) budget goal level and budget 
goal commitment (standardised path coefficient = 
0.145, p < 0.05), and (3) budget goal acceptance and 
budget goal commitment (standardised path coeffi- 
cient = 0.507, p < 0.05). Taken together, these results 
support the major premise of goal-setting theory 
(see Locke et al., 1981; Locke and Latham, 1990). 
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14 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
Table 3 
Discriminant validity test 
Correlation Squared correlation 
TE-TA 
TE-BP 
TE-JRI 
TE-BGL 
TE-BGA 
TE-BGC 
TA-BP 
TA-JRI 
TA-BGL 
TA-BGA 
TA-BGC 
BP-JRI 
BP-BGL 
BP-BGA 
BP-BGC 
JRI-BGL 
JRI-BGA 
JRI-BGC 
BGL-BGA 
BGL-BGC 
BGA-BGC 
0.454 
4.249 
4.030 
4.186 
4.216 
4.118 
0.058 
0.320 
4.025 
0.161 
0.199 
0.25 1 
0.194 
0.540 
0.49 1 
0.007 
0.268 
0.317 
0.337 
0.347 
0.678 
0.206 
0.062 
0 .oo 1 
0.035 
0.047 
0.014 
0.003 
0.102 
0.001 
0.026 
0.040 
0.063 
0.038 
0.292 
0.241 
0 .oo 1 
0.072 
0.100 
0.1 14 
0.120 
0.460 
TE = task exceptions; TA = task analysability; BP = budgetary participation; JRI = job-relevant information; 
BGL = budget goal level; BGA = budget goal acceptance; BGC = budget goal commitment. 
The results presented in Figure 2 showed that 
there was a positive and statistically significant re- 
lationship between job-relevant information and 
budget goal acceptance (standardised path coeffi- 
cient = 0.152, p < 0.05), thereby supporting hy- 
pothesis H10. Support was also found for 
hypothesis H 1 1 which states that there was a posi- 
tive and statistically significant relationship be- 
tween job-relevant information and budget goal 
commitment (standardised path coefficient = 
0.142, p < 0.05). Finally, the results indicated that 
there was a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between budget goal commitment 
and job performance (standardised path coefficient 
= 0.358, p < 0.05), thereby supporting hypothesis 
H12. 
5. Conclusions and limitations 
This study attempts to extend prior participative 
budgeting studies by incorporating a causal an- 
tecedent of participative budgeting (i.e., task un- 
certainty) and additional motivational variables 
(i.e., budget goal level, budget goal acceptance and 
budget goal commitment), relying on information- 
processing theory and a goal-setting theoretical 
framework. The results of our study suggest that 
task uncertainty is an important antecedent of 
budgetary participation. Specifically, our results 
concluded that when subordinates are faced with 
tasks which have a high number of exceptions and 
a low level of analysability, their needs for partic- 
ipative budgeting increases. In other words, it is 
suggested that budgetary participation is caused by 
the degree of task exceptions and task analysabili- 
ty. More specifically, our results reveal that subor- 
dinates who face with tasks which have low level 
analysability will require additional job-relevant 
information. It is noteworthy that the results of our 
study are consistent with those of Shields and 
Shields (1998:60), who claimed that the existence 
of participative budgeting for sharing internal in- 
formation is predicted to be associated with task 
uncertainty. Furthermore, the information needs of 
subordinates' under various degree of task uncer- 
tainty are also consistent with Galbraith (1973:4) 
who argued that ' . . .the greater the task uncertain- 
ty, the greater the amount of information that must 
be processed among decision-makers during task 
execution in order to achieve a given level of per- 
formance.' 
This study contributes to the existing literature 
by relying on information-processing theory and 
goal-setting theory to further our understanding of 
how participative budgeting really works, and the 
process by which it may happen. Specifically, the 
results of this study were consistent with our theo- 
retical expectations. Our study confirmed that 
higher levels of budgetary participation led to in- 
creased job-relevant information under condition 
of high task uncertainty. This result 'supports the 
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information-processing theory and the cognitive 
role of budgetary participation, which is consistent 
with numerous prior empirical studies (e.g., Kren, 
1992; Magner et al., 1996; Shields and Shields, 
1998). These results provide additional evidence 
to support the proposition that the degree of task 
uncertainty causes increased in information needs 
from subordinates, who in turn, increased their de- 
sire for the opportunity to participate. 
The results of our study also confirmed that par- 
ticipation in setting the budget influences subordi- 
nates’ budget goal level and motivations (i.e., 
budget goal acceptance and budget goal commit- 
ment), which ultimately enhances their job per- 
formance. The results were also consistent with 
our theoretical expectations. Specifically, our re- 
sults confirmed that (1) high level of budgetary 
participation is related to higher budget goal level, 
and (2) high level of budgetary participation is re- 
lated to higher budget goal acceptance and budget 
goal commitment. These results lend further em- 
pirical support to previous accounting studies 
(e.g., Kren and Liao, 1988; Wier, 1993). Taken to- 
gether, these results provide support for the appli- 
cation of goal-setting theory and the motivational 
role of budgetary participation. 
Most importantly, our study reveals that budget- 
ary participation exists for three purposes: (1) cog- 
nitive, (2) planning and goal-setting, and (3) 
motivational, when there is task uncertainty. First, 
our results suggest that budgetary participation ex- 
ists initially for cognitive purpose when there is 
task uncertainty. In other words, the demand for 
budgetary participation is caused by task uncer- 
tainty. The cognitive role of budgetary participa- 
tion provides subordinates the opportunity to 
gather and share job-relevant information with 
their superiors and peers. In doing so, they can 
gain a better understanding of the task at hand. 
Second, our results suggest that the reason for 
the existence of budgetary participation is for plan- 
ning and goal-setting and for motivational purpos- 
es. Specifically, our results suggest that budgetary 
participation allows subordinates the opportunity 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
to set difficult but attainable budget goals. The op- 
portunity to participate in planning and budget 
goal-setting resulted in an increase in their feelings 
of ego-involvement, sense of control and trust, 
which in turn, causes more acceptance of, and 
commitment to, their budget goals. It is found that 
highly committed subordinates will exert addition- 
al effort in an attempt to attain their budget goals, 
which ultimately enhances their job performance. 
Several limitations of the study are noted. First, 
this study did not take into account other potential 
antecedents of budgetary participation such as in- 
formation asymmetry (Shields and Young, 1993; 
Shields and Shields, 1998), perceived environ- 
mental uncertainty (Chong and Chong, 1997; 
Shields and Shields, 1998), personality variables 
such as locus of control (Mia, 1987; Chong and 
Eggleton, 2003), and strategy (Chong and Chong, 
1997). In addition, this study did not consider 
other potential intervening variables such as budg- 
et-based incentive scheme (Shields and Young, 
1993), organisational commitment (Nouri and 
Parker, 1998; Chong et al., 2006), and budget goal 
feedback (Locke and Latham, 1990). 
Second, our study has examined only one aspect 
of the cognitive role of budgetary participation, 
namely to communicate job-relevant information. 
While it is possible that subordinates can withhold 
their private information in the budget-setting 
process, thereby creating budgetary slack, our 
study did not attempt to test such effect. Thus, fu- 
ture research may extend our study to investigate 
the impact of budgetary participation on budgetary 
slack within the goal-setting theory framework as 
proposed in our study. Third, the sample for our 
study was selected from the manufacturing indus- 
tries. Therefore, generalisation of the results of our 
study to other industries such as financial services 
industries should be done cautiously. Further re- 
search involving the financial services industries 
would be worthwhile. Fourth, this study used a 
self-rating scale to measure job performance, 
which would lead to the problem associated with 
higher leniency error and lower variability error in 
the score (Prien and Liske, 1962; Thornton, 1968). 
Fifth, the use of Mahoney et al’s ( 1963,1965) per- 
formance scale is potentially a problem as it meas- 
ures overall job (managerial) performance rather 
than budget-related performance. Furthermore, as 
all responses of this study came from the same 
manager to a set of survey items, the potential 
problem of common method biases may exist.15 
Finally, our path (structural) model implies 
causality. However, the survey method employed 
in our study allows for examination of statistical 
associations at one point in time. The various state- 
ments about the direction of relationships pro- 
posed in this study can only be made in terms of 
the consistency of the results with the effects pro- 
I s  Cornmon Method Biases are a problem as they are one of 
main sources of measurement error (Podsakoff et al., 2003). It 
has been argued that measurement error threatens the validity 
of the conclusions about the relationships between measures 
and has both a random and a systematic component (Bagozzi 
and Yi, 1991; Nunnally, 1978). For a critical review of the lit- 
erature and recommended remedies of Common method bias- 
es, see Podsakoff et al. (2003). We conducted the Hurman’s 
one-juctor test to see the extent to which common method 
variance was a concern. A factor analysis was conducted on all 
items measuring the eight variables. We obtained an eight-fac- 
tor solution using the eigenvalue greater than one criterion. 
Our factor analysis result explained 66.02% of the variance. 
The first factor accounted for only 11.21% of the variance. 
Given that no single factor emerged explaining majority of the 
variance, we conclude that common method variance does not 
seem to be a significant threat to our results obtained. 
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posed in the theoretical discussions. The use of a 
different research method, such as longitudinal 
field study, would be appropriate to systematically 
investigate the theoretical causal relationships pro- 
posed in our study. 
17 
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